In Butler, the Superior Court overturned the decision of a Court of Common Pleas regarding deed language, specifically the definition of “minerals” as it relates to oil and gas rights in Pennsylvania. See Fulbright's Alert, When is a Mineral Not a Mineral?.
In its Order granting the petition for allowance of appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the petitioner’s framing of the issue:
In interpreting a deed reservation for minerals, whether the Superior Court erred in remanding the case for the introduction of scientific and historic evidence about the Marcellus shale and the natural gas contained therein, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held (1) a rebuttable presumption exists that parties intend the term minerals to include only metallic substances, and (2) only the parties' intent can rebut the presumption to include non-metallic substances.
See the Butler Docket Sheet.
This post was prepared by Fulbright energy lawyer Jeremy Mercer.
